School Trust Lands: The Law of America's Educational Land Trusts

Appendix A — Idaho (v2)

August 23, 2026 (case line built against the four full primary opinions held in the Library's collection; first publication) Drafted with Claude, an AI system, and published by America's School Trust Library. Not legal advice.

About this appendix. The hornbook reads forward, from doctrine to cases. This appendix reads backward, from state to doctrine: Idaho's school-trust cases are listed in bullet form, each entry cross-citing the hornbook sections it supports, so a practitioner can open her own state's entry and walk into the treatise from there. Every case below was read against the full primary opinion held in the Library's collection; claims that could not be resolved from a primary are flagged rather than asserted. Idaho matters for two reasons that pull in opposite directions, and the entry is organized around the tension. Its Supreme Court has given the field its cleanest statement that a legislature may not redirect the trustee's attention away from the beneficiaries. The same court has twice turned beneficiary-side organizations away at the courthouse door.

Why this entry appears now, and what it withdraws. Idaho was one of four states whose primaries the Library held but whose appendix had never been published. Building it disclosed that the Library's live Idaho pages had, for months, attributed the state's grazing-lease holding to the wrong opinion, described a fiduciary-breach holding that does not exist, and cited Idaho for a beneficiary-standing rule that Idaho law refuses. The Library's own authorities register had recorded the correct answer since June 10, 2026. The register was right; the pages were never brought into line with it. What the rebuild found is set out at the end.

IDAHO

Granting instrument. Admission Act of July 3, 1890, 26 Stat. 215 — sections 16 and 36 of every township for the support of common schools, with further grants to named institutions, each held as a distinct trust for the institution named. The Idaho Supreme Court cites the instrument as the "Idaho Admission Bill, 26 Stat. L. 215, ch. 656, § 5(a)," and reads it as confining the proceeds: monies received from the sale or lease of school endowment lands "shall be reserved for school purposes only." Idaho Watersheds Project v. State Board of Land Commissioners (IWP II), 133 Idaho 64, 67, 982 P.2d 367 (1999). Justice Johnson, writing separately in Selkirk-Priest I, cites § 4 of the same Act for the grant of land "for the support of common schools." 899 P.2d at 956. → §§ 2.4, 2.7; Appendix B.

Constitutional reception — the management mandate. Idaho Const. art. IX, § 8 is the operative text, and the Idaho Supreme Court quotes it as amended:

§ 8. Location and disposition of public lands. — It shall be the duty of the state board of land commissioners to provide for the location, protection, sale or rental of all the lands heretofore, or which may hereafter be granted to or acquired by the state by or from the general government, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, and in such manner as will secure the maximum long term financial return to the institution to which granted or to the state if not specifically granted; provided, that no state lands shall be sold for less than the appraised price. . . .

Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass'n, Inc. v. State ex rel. Andrus, 899 P.2d 949, 952 (Idaho 1995) (the italics on "to the institution to which granted" are the court's). Two cautions a practitioner needs. First, the phrase is "maximum long term financial return," unhyphenated, in the constitutional text as the court renders it; the hyphenated form circulating in the secondary literature is not the reporter's. Second, the words "to the institution to which granted" are not original: Justice Johnson, concurring in part and dissenting in part, dates them to 1982, "more than ninety years after" admission, citing 1982 Idaho Sess. L., H.J.R. 18, 935, 936. 899 P.2d at 956. That is a separate writing, not a holding, and is cited here as such. → Ch. 3; Ch. 6; Ch. 7.

Article IX, § 8 also carries the auction command. As IWP II renders it, the section requires the Legislature to "provide by law that the general grants of land made by congress to the state shall be judiciously located and carefully preserved and held in trust, subject to disposal at public auction for the use and benefit of the respective object . . . for which said grants of land were made . . . ." 133 Idaho at 67. [VERIFY — this passage against the bound reporter. The Library's copy of IWP II is a machine-read text carrying visible optical-recognition damage inside this very sentence ("fin' which" for "for which"); the fragment is reproduced here with the damage repaired in brackets and should not be block-quoted from the Library's copy in a filing.]

Constitutional reception — the fund. Art. IX, § 3 accepts the federal grants; art. IX, § 4 establishes the public school permanent endowment fund as inviolate, with only interest and other income available for current distribution. [VERIFY — neither section's text is quoted in any primary the Library holds. Selkirk-Priest I names "Article IX, §§ 8 and 4 of the Idaho Constitution" as the provisions "establishing the school endowment lands trust," 899 P.2d at 952, but does not set out § 4. The § 3 and § 4 descriptions here rest on secondary sources.]

Administering body. The State Board of Land Commissioners, with the Idaho Department of Lands as its operating arm. The Library's held primaries fix the Board's membership as of 1995: the caption of Selkirk-Priest I names Governor Cecil Andrus, Secretary of State Pete T. Cenarrusa, Attorney General Larry EchoHawk, State Auditor J.D. Williams, and Superintendent of Public Instruction Jerry L. Evans, "as the State Board of Land Commissioners," together with Stanley F. Hamilton of the Department of Lands. [VERIFY — current composition. The Library's other surfaces name a State Controller in the Auditor's place; no held primary confirms that change or its date.] → Ch. 3.

Who the beneficiaries are — Idaho has answered, and the answer is narrow. This is the single most consequential thing in the Idaho line, and it runs against the field's intuition. The direct beneficiaries of the school endowment lands trust are the schools, or the school districts of which the individual schools are a part — not parents, not grandparents, and not, on the majority's holding, the students themselves. Selkirk-Priest I, 899 P.2d at 952. The practical consequence is that an organization which does not represent a school or a district lacks the legally protected interest Idaho standing doctrine requires, and cannot litigate the administration of trust assets at all. → Ch. 12; Ch. 13.

Scale. [VERIFY — acreage retained, permanent-fund corpus, and annual distribution. No held primary supplies any of them, and the Library's own surfaces do not yet agree with one another. Figures are not asserted here until they are reconciled against a source the Library holds.]

Why Idaho matters to the field. Two contributions, and they should be cited separately.

The first is the sole-beneficiary rule. In IWP II the Idaho Supreme Court held a statute facially unconstitutional because the Legislature had directed the trustee to weigh interests the constitution does not name. That is the cleanest available authority for the proposition that legislative redirection of trustee loyalty is not a policy choice but a constitutional defect — and it is the Idaho holding a brief should actually reach for.

The second is negative authority on standing, and it is why Idaho should be cited with care in any argument about who may sue. Selkirk-Priest I and II (1995, 1996) turned away two beneficiary-side environmental organizations, the first because it did not represent a school or district and the second because its members' recreational use of the land was too occasional to be a distinct injury. IWP II then found standing — but for a rejected lease applicant and disqualified high bidder, on a straightforward individualized-injury theory, not as a beneficiary. Idaho belongs in the column of states whose courts have narrowed trust-enforcement standing, not widened it.

The cases

• Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass'n, Inc. v. State ex rel. Andrus ("SPBA I"), 127 Idaho 239, 899 P.2d 949 (1995) (McDevitt, C.J.; CourtListener opinion ID 1360761).

  • Posture. Two Idaho non-profit corporations — Selkirk-Priest Basin Association and Idaho Environmental Council — sued the State Board of Land Commissioners and the Idaho Department of Lands over the Lower Green Bonnet Timber Sale, a sale of timber on school endowment trust lands in the Trapper Creek watershed in Bonner and Boundary Counties. The district court granted the Land Board summary judgment on standing. Intermountain Forest Industry Association intervened and cross-appealed on the admissibility of the plaintiffs' affidavits.
  • The beneficiary holding. Affirmed on the trust claim. "Because the direct beneficiaries of the school endowment lands trust are the schools (or the school districts of which the individual schools are a part), the environmental groups lack the legally protected interest that Bear Lake requires. Neither environmental group represents a single school or school district. Consequently, the district court correctly ruled that the environmental groups lack the standing necessary to challenge the administration of school endowment lands trust assets." 899 P.2d at 952. The court reaches the beneficiary identification through Moon: "As Moon recognized, the institutional beneficiaries referred to in art. IX, § 8 are the 'public schools.'" Id.
  • The charitable-trust route, closed in a footnote. The groups argued in the alternative that the school lands trust is a charitable trust and that parties with a "special interest" may enforce it under Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 391. The court declined to decide whether the trust is charitable and disposed of the argument on its own terms: "However, even if we assumed that to be true, the environmental groups clearly do not have such an interest." Id. n.1. Practitioners should note what this costs: § 391 is the standard exception to attorney-general exclusivity in charitable-trust enforcement, and Idaho has left it unavailable to organizational plaintiffs on these facts.
  • What the groups won. Reversed in part, on a theory outside the trust. The public-trust-doctrine claim survived summary judgment "only as it relates to public trust resources below the natural high water mark of Trapper Creek," 899 P.2d at 955, because affidavit evidence alleged that the proposed harvest "will cause similar negative effects in the future which will contribute to cumulative damage of public trust resources," and "[w]hether or not this is actually the case is a decision to be made by the trier of fact," id. at 954–55. The distinction is structural, and a footnote makes it explicit: the public lands referenced in Article IX "do not include the beds of navigable waters o[r] lands thereunder below high-water mark," id. at 953 n.2 (quoting Northern Pac. R.R. v. Hirzel, 29 Idaho 438, 456, 161 P. 854, 859 (1916)). The survival of the public-trust claim is therefore not authority that trust beneficiaries may sue over trust land. It is authority about a different res.
  • Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. He would locate the beneficial interest in the children: "In my view, the Court incorrectly identifies school districts as the direct beneficiaries of the school lands trust. In my view, the students in the common schools are the beneficiaries." 899 P.2d at 956. And: "The true beneficiaries are those who benefit from the state's constitutional duty to maintain common schools — the students. The environmental groups have standing to bring this action on behalf of students, whose parents are members of the groups." Id. His ground is that the "institution to which granted" language postdates admission by ninety years, and that under American Nat. Bk. v. Joint Ind. S. Dist., 61 Idaho 405, 411, 102 P.2d 826, 828 (1940), "the organization and maintenance of the districts is purely a matter of administrative convenience in the execution of the constitutional mandate." This is the losing position, and it is the only place in the opinion where a student- or parent-based standing theory appears. It is valuable to a beneficiary-identity argument precisely as a reasoned dissent, and must be cited as one.
  • What this case does not contain. The words "fiduciary" and "trustee" do not appear; the Land Board is nowhere described as a trustee owing fiduciary duties. Neither I.C. § 58-405 nor § 58-407 is mentioned. No statute was held unconstitutional. Nothing is said about the Attorney General's enforcement authority; the only "attorney general" references are to Larry EchoHawk as a Board member and as counsel, and to the private attorney general doctrine, raised for fees and held waived.
  • Supports: Ch. 12 (identifying the beneficiary class); Ch. 13 (who may sue — as contrary authority); Ch. 14 (the attorney-general problem — for the closed § 391 route).
  • Copy held. Star pagination is Pacific Reporter only, 899 P.2d 950–956. There is no Idaho Reports star pagination in the Library's copy, so no "127 Idaho at ___" pin can be produced from it. Page 949 (caption, docket No. 20815, dates) is unmarked. Footnotes are gathered after the last star marker; footnote page pins are inferred from where the reference falls and are marked as inferences.

• Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass'n v. State ex rel. Batt ("SPBA II"), 128 Idaho 831, 919 P.2d 1032 (1996) (Silak, J., unanimous; CourtListener opinion ID 5174347).

  • Posture. The same association's challenge to a different sale — approximately 5.2 million board feet of timber on endowment trust lands near Priest Lake, in an area known as Bugle Ridge, enlarged in the final plan to 7.4 million board feet on reduced acreage. Summary judgment for the State and the intervenor on standing; the appeal was stayed pending SPBA I and then argued on SPBA's remaining standing theories. Affirmed.
  • The holding, in the court's own opening words. "We hold that SPBA has not demonstrated a distinct and palpable injury to its recreational interest in the area which confers standing to challenge the State Board of Land Commissioners' (Land Board) administration of endowment trust lands." 128 Idaho at 831–32.
  • Why the recreational theory failed — and the limit of that failure. "SPBA's affidavits do not establish a peculiar or personal injury that is different than that suffered by any other member of the public. The affidavits indicate the members use the area for hiking and berry-picking and that such use is occasional at best, with the most regular contact being one member who visits the area two weeks out of the year." Id. at 834. The court distinguished, rather than rejected, recreational-interest standing: in Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary County, 128 Idaho 371, 913 P.2d 1141 (1996), "only the affidavit of a commercial guide in the county demonstrated a sufficient injury in fact so as to confer standing to challenge the ordinance." Id. A statement that recreational or aesthetic use can never confer Idaho standing overstates this case. The holding is about the quality of these affidavits.
  • The rule the later cases quote. "The injury must be distinct and palpable and not be one suffered alike by all citizens in the jurisdiction." Id. at 833–34 (citing Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989)). The sentence straddles the page break; the 833–34 span IWP II uses for it is exact. Note that at 834 the court's own internal quotation drops the conjunction — "distinct palpable injury" — and should be reproduced as printed.
  • Beneficiary status was not decided here. The court recites SPBA I and records that the point was conceded: "SPBA does not contest our decision in SPBA I that it lacks standing to challenge the administration of endowment trust lands because it does not represent a beneficiary of the endowment land trust." Id. at 833. Cite SPBA I, not SPBA II, for the beneficiary holding.
  • Judicial review of Land Board timber sales is statutorily foreclosed. I.C. § 58-405 provides that "decisions by the state board of land commissioners shall not receive judicial review pursuant to the administrative procedure act," and because I.C. § 67-5270 grants APA review "unless other provision of law is applicable to the particular matter," the APA defers. "Because I.C. § 58-405 prohibits APA review of Land Board timber sales and the APA defers to this prohibition, SPBA cannot claim standing in this matter as an aggrieved party under the APA." Id. at 834. This is a serious structural fact about Idaho enforcement and belongs in any survey of state-level procedural barriers. → Ch. 16.
  • No constitutional question was reached. SPBA's First Amendment, equal protection and due process claims appear once, in the statement of issues at 833, and are never returned to. The constitutionality of §§ 58-405 and 58-407 fell with standing: "Because SPBA has not demonstrated that it possesses standing to challenge the timber sale in the first instance, it may not maintain a claim of invalidity under the Declaratory Judgment Act." Id. at 834–35.
  • What this case does not contain. "Fiduciary," "trustee" and "corpus" do not appear. "Attorney General" does not appear. The one affirmative statement of the Board's duty — "The Land Board is charged with the duty to manage the endowment trust lands in a manner which secures the maximum long-term financial return," id. at 831–32 — sits in the facts, carries no citation, and is background, not holding.
  • Supports: Ch. 13 (standing — the distinct-and-palpable requirement); Ch. 16 (statutory preclusion of review).
  • Copy held. Star markers 833, 834, 835 only. Page 831 — caption, counsel, syllabus — is not in the Library's copy and nothing may be pinned there; text preceding the *833 marker should be pinned conservatively as 831–32. The machine-read text carries recognition damage in the concluding paragraph, including three wrong section numbers ("I.C § 67-6270" for 67-5270; "I.C. § 58-406" and "§§ 68-405" for 58-405). Do not block-quote the conclusion from the Library's copy.

• Idaho Watersheds Project v. State Board of Land Commissioners, 133 Idaho 55, 982 P.2d 358 (1999) (per curiam; original proceeding; CourtListener opinion ID 1253294). The Library formerly filed this as "IWP I." That short name is now retired here — see the note on naming below.

  • Posture. "This is an original proceeding challenging the constitutionality of House Joint Resolution No. 6 (H.J.R.6) which proposed amendments to Article 9, § 4 and § 8 of the Idaho Constitution." 133 Idaho at 55. H.J.R. 6 was adopted by the Legislature in 1998 and "was approved by the voters on November 3, 1998." Id. at 57. IWP and John Marvel petitioned for a writ of prohibition on November 18, 1998; the petition was argued on an expedited basis on December 16, 1998.
  • What H.J.R. 6 would have done. As to § 4: rename the fund the "Public School Permanent Endowment Fund," create a new "Land Bank Fund," and route sale proceeds through it. As to § 8: "delete the word 'disposal' and replace it with the word 'sale' so that the relevant phrase would read: 'the general grants of land made by congress to the state shall be . . . subject to sale at public auction.'" Id. at 56. The ballot put the change to the electorate as: "To change the word disposal to sale in reference to the disposition of certain lands?" Id. at 57.
  • Holding and disposition. Relief was granted on one ground, and it is an election-procedure ground. "However, we find that the subject of how school endowment land proceeds are invested differs essentially from the subject of whether auctions should take place regarding only sales, as opposed to leases and sales, of school endowment lands. We conclude that the proposed amendments to the two sections of Article 9 do not in any way depend upon one another. They are 'incongruous and essentially unrelated,' and consequently should have been submitted separately to the voters. . . . We therefore hold that the amendments proposed by H.J.R. 6 violate Article 20, § 2 of the Idaho Constitution." Id. at 60 (quoting Idaho Water Resource Bd. v. Kramer, 97 Idaho 535, 552, 548 P.2d 35, 52 (1976)). Article 20, § 2 requires that "[i]f two (2) or more amendments are proposed, they shall be submitted in such manner that the electors shall vote for or against each of them separately." Id. The disposition: "Accordingly, the petition for writ of prohibition is granted." Id. The publication and misleading-statement challenges were time barred because they were not presented before the election. Id. at 59.
  • The scope limit, stated by the court. "In reviewing the constitutionality of H.J.R. 6, we limit our review to a determination of the constitutionality of the methods and procedures utilized in the passage of H.J.R. 6." Id. at 57. The court decided nothing about the substance of Article IX, and the opinion should not be read — as the Library formerly read it — as holding that Article IX binds the electorate. The consequence of the disposition is that the existing "disposal . . . at public auction" language survived; the reason is the separate-vote defect.
  • What this case does not contain, and this matters. "Grazing," "preference" and "standing" appear nowhere in the opinion. It decides nothing about grazing leases, lessee preference, conflict-resolution rules, below-market rents, competitive bidding, or who may sue. Two passages that look like trust holdings are not the court's words: the "maximum long-term financial return" language at 61 is the proposed amended constitutional text reproduced in Appendix I, and the fiduciary-duty and competitive-bidding language at 63 is the Legislative Council's ballot-pamphlet argument in favor, at 64 the argument against. Pages 61 through 64 are appendix material. Nothing there is the Idaho Supreme Court speaking, and nothing there may be attributed to it.
  • Supports: Ch. 19 (structural reform and retrenchment attempts — an amendment package stopped on submission grounds); the companion-case note wherever IWP II is cited.
  • Copy held. Star markers 56 through 64, complete; page 55 is unmarked. Note that page 64 is shared with the first page of IWP II, so a bare "133 Idaho at 64" pin is ambiguous and must carry the full case name. The machine-read text carries recognition damage at several points, including in the conclusion ("they were not revised before the election," almost certainly "raised"), and inside the reproduced constitutional text. [VERIFY against the bound reporter before block-quoting the Appendix I text.]

• Idaho Watersheds Project v. State Board of Land Commissioners ("IWP II"), 133 Idaho 64, 982 P.2d 367 (1999) (Johnson, J. Pro Tem; Silak, Schroeder and Walters, JJ., and Burdick, J. Pro Tem, concurring; CourtListener opinion ID 1252918). This is the case that carries Idaho's trust holding.

  • Posture. IWP submitted twenty-four conflict grazing lease applications in 1996 for expiring endowment leases. The Department recommended "qualified applicant" status on only six; IWP reached auction on three, was high bidder in two, and was denied the leases on land-management grounds. "Therefore, IWP received no lease awards out of its 1996 lease applications." IWP sued for a declaratory judgment that I.C. § 58-310B is unconstitutional facially and as applied, and for APA review of the Board's handling of the applications. The trial court upheld the statute and the Board's actions; IWP appealed. 133 Idaho at 66. This is a direct appeal, not an original proceeding.
  • The constitutional holding. "By attempting to promote funding for the schools and the state through the leasing of school endowment lands, I.C. § 58-310B violates the requirements of Article IX, § 8." Id. at 67 (italics in original). And the rule in its cleanest form: "Rather than seeking to provide income to the schools and the state in general, Article IX, § 8 requires that the State consider only the 'maximum long term financial return' to the schools in the leasing of school endowment public grazing lands." Id.
  • What made the record. At a December 1996 hearing the Board said it needed to weigh sales, income and property taxes from businesses on the leased land, and stated that $22.4 million had been earned the previous year from rents on school endowment lands and funneled directly to the schools, "while an additional $800 million had been collected in various taxes that benefit the state as a whole." Id. The court treated the Board's own account as the proof of the violation — "[t]he factors considered by the Board in this case mirror the factors presented to the Senate and discussed prior to the enactment of I.C. § 58-310B," id. — and then stated the sole-beneficiary rule. It did not label the $800 million figure an "argument" and reject it; it read the Board's reliance on it as impermissible.
  • Discretion, bounded. "We acknowledge that '[t]he Board is granted broad discretion in determining what constitutes the maximum long term financial return for the schools.' . . . Section 58-310B removes much of the Board's broad discretion, however, by impermissibly directing the Board to focus on the schools, the state, and the Idaho livestock industry in assessing lease applications, all to the detriment of other potential bidders like IWP, which might provide 'maximum long term financial return' to the schools, but not to the state and the Idaho livestock industry." Id. at 67–68 (quoting Idaho Watersheds Project v. Board of Land Comm'rs, 128 Idaho 761, 765, 918 P.2d 1206, 1210 (1996)). Note that "the schools, the state, and the Idaho livestock industry" is the court's characterization of what the statute does, not a quotation of statutory text; the opinion never sets out § 58-310B's language.
  • Standing — the theory, precisely. IWP appears in this opinion only as an applicant and bidder, never as a beneficiary or as an environmental organization. "In the present case, the State took direct action against IWP in rejecting the applications for auction and in rejecting IWP's high bids following the auctions that were held. IWP was individually harmed by the criteria set out in I.C. § 58-310B and by the State's actions in applying that criteria to the applications. . . . IWP, as an applicant to become a lessor of state endowment public grazing lands, has a personal stake in the constitutionality of I.C. § 58-310B." Id. at 66. The court frames the requirement through SPBA II: the injury must be "distinct and palpable," not "one suffered alike by all citizens in the jurisdiction." Id. (citing 128 Idaho at 833–34). This is bidder standing. The words "Attorney General" do not appear in the opinion, no exclusive-enforcement argument was made, and none was rejected. (The printed "lessor" for "lessee" is in the harvested text; it is reproduced rather than silently corrected.)
  • Remedy. "Having declared I.C. § 58-310B to be unconstitutional, it necessarily follows that the 1996 leases the Board awarded for which IWP was an applicant but was not allowed to bid at an auction were improperly awarded and must be opened for applications again." Id. at 68. The court held I.C. § 58-310 to be a "regulation[ ] . . . prescribed by law" the Board has a duty to follow, and directed that its auction procedures govern on remand. Id. The invalidation reaches those 1996 leases, not the whole endowment lease portfolio.
  • The companion. "[W]e first note that in a companion case the Court has today concluded that the attempted amendment of Article IX, § 8 in the November 3, 1998 general election was ineffective." Id. at 67 (citing 133 Idaho 55, 982 P.2d 358 (1999)). [VERIFY — the two opinions' filing dates. The Library's retrieval records April 2 and July 22, 1999, which sits oddly with "today"; resolve against the bound reporter.]
  • What this case does not contain. "Fiduciary," "breach," "trustee" and "market" appear nowhere in the opinion. There is no finding that the Board breached a duty, no comparison of rents paid to rents obtainable, and no holding that below-market rents are themselves a breach. The court expressly stopped: "Because of this resolution of the appeal, we do not reach other issues presented," id. at 68, which disposed of IWP's arbitrary-and-discriminatory claim without decision. This is a facial constitutional invalidation of a statute, and citing it as a below-market-valuation breach case misstates it.
  • Supports: § 4.3 and § 4.6(a) (breaching enactments void); Ch. 6 (loyalty — the legislature may not divide the trustee's allegiance); Ch. 11 (leasing; competitive disposition on remand); Ch. 13 (standing — bidder standing, distinct from the beneficiary line); Ch. 18 (nullity).
  • Copy held. Star markers 66, 67, 68 only. *Nothing before the 66 marker may be pinned — that includes the opinion's own opening sentence stating the holding, which sits on what is almost certainly page 65 but carries no marker; cite it as 133 Idaho at 64–65 or verify against the reporter. The caption, syllabus and counsel listing on page 64 are not in the Library's copy. There is no Pacific Reporter star pagination, so no "982 P.2d at ___" pin can be produced from this copy — parallel pins carried in earlier Library materials are unverifiable and have been withdrawn. The text carries recognition damage including "I.C. § 58-31 OB" for § 58-310B and "Pro Tern" for "Pro Tem."

A note on naming, and a warning about short cites

The 1999 opinions both call the 1996 decision — Idaho Watersheds Project v. State Board of Land Commissioners, 128 Idaho 761, 918 P.2d 1206 — "IWP I." The Library formerly applied that label to the 1999 H.J.R. 6 proceeding, which produced two different cases carrying the same short name in its own substrate and is one reason the holdings were transposed on the public pages. This appendix uses "IWP I" for the 1996 decision only, follows the courts, and cites the 1999 proceeding by its full name and citation. A brief that writes "IWP I" without a citation is inviting the same error.

Authorities identified but not held

The Library does not hold these opinions. They are named here because the held primaries quote or cite them, and because two of them carry propositions the Library has previously stated without the underlying text.

• Idaho Watersheds Project v. State Board of Land Commissioners, 128 Idaho 761, 918 P.2d 1206 (1996) ("IWP I"). The highest acquisition priority in this state. It is the source of the auction-discretion rule, as quoted in the 1999 companion: the Land Board "does not have the discretion to grant a lease to an applicant who does not place a bid at an auction, based upon Idaho's constitutional and statutory[ ]mandate that the Board conduct an auction," 133 Idaho at 56 (quoting 128 Idaho at 766, 918 P.2d at 1211), and of the discretion sentence IWP II quotes at 128 Idaho at 765. Every Library statement that Idaho requires true competitive auction when conflicting lease applications are submitted traces to this case, and the Library has been pinning it to opinions that do not contain it.
• Idaho Watersheds Project v. State Board of Land Commissioners, 133 Idaho 68, 982 P.2d 371 (1999) — a third 1999 opinion, cited at 133 Idaho at 56 as the appeal concerning the 1995 lease applications. Relationship to IWP II unexamined.
• Moon v. State Bd. of Land Commrs., 111 Idaho 389, 724 P.2d 125 (1986). Selkirk-Priest I relies on it for the beneficiary identification and characterizes it, at 899 P.2d 952, as "explain[ing] the relationship between the school endowment lands trust and the public school fund trust in upholding as constitutional a statute allowing for application of up to 10% of the proceeds from endowment land timber sales and grazing leases for maintenance and protection of those lands." The passage Selkirk-Priest I quotes from it describes two trusts and locates the State's duties in art. IX, § 3 (money corpus) and art. IX, § 8 (land corpus). The Library's public pages have described Moon as a case in which the state was caught diverting school-land interest to the general fund and made to return it — an account sourced in the Library's Idaho state file to the 1992 Idaho Attorney General's annual report, not to the opinion. The only characterization the Library can take from a held primary is Selkirk-Priest's, and it describes an upholding. The two are not necessarily inconsistent; an opinion can sustain one provision and condemn another. Acquire the opinion before repeating either account.
• Balderston v. Brady, 17 Idaho 567, 107 P. 493 (1910). Cited once, as a bare see also supporting the exercise of original jurisdiction, 133 Idaho at 57. No characterization is given, and the Library's account of its holding rests on no held source.
• East Side Blaine County (1921) and the Wasden cottage-site line (2010, 2012). Named on the Library's Idaho state page; no held primary, and no held primary cites them.
• Idaho Const. art. IX, §§ 3 and 4, and Idaho Code §§ 58-310, 58-310B, 58-405 and 58-407 in their own text.

Cross-reference map (section → Idaho authority)

What the rebuild found

The quotations the Library published were not the problem; the case names attached to them were. Four opinions were read whole. Five statements on live Library pages could not be supported, and four of the five were miscitations rather than misquotations.

1. The grazing holding was pinned to an election-law case. The Court Room atlas told readers that Idaho Watersheds Project v. State Board of Land Commissioners, 133 Idaho 55, "invalidated the State Board of Land Commissioners' grazing-lease conflict-resolution rules." That opinion contains the word "grazing" zero times. It is a per curiam original proceeding about whether a ballot measure was properly submitted. The grazing holding is IWP II's, at 133 Idaho 64 — and even there the description was wrong in kind: what fell was I.C. § 58-310B, a statute, not the Board's own rules.

2. A fiduciary-breach holding that does not exist. The Idaho case file and a Reading Room essay both stated that the court "held that the State Board of Land Commissioners had breached its fiduciary duty by leasing school trust lands at rates below the maximum long-term financial return obtainable through competitive procedures," and that an administrative valuation scheme producing below-market rents is "on that ground alone, a breach." The words fiduciary, breach, trustee and market appear nowhere in IWP II. No breach was found; no rents were valued. Withdrawn and replaced with the holding the court actually gave.

3. Idaho cited for a beneficiary-standing rule Idaho refuses. Three Library pages — including the essay on the beneficiaries who cannot speak — placed Idaho among the states whose courts permit beneficiary-side enforcement, on the strength of a sentence saying the court "held that beneficiary-side plaintiffs had standing to sue to enforce the trust, rejecting the state's argument that only the Attorney General could pursue such claims." No Idaho opinion the Library holds says this. "Attorney General" does not appear in IWP II or in either Selkirk-Priest opinion in any enforcement sense. IWP II's standing holding runs to a rejected bidder. And Idaho's actual beneficiary-standing law is Selkirk-Priest I, which denied standing to two beneficiary-side organizations and closed the Restatement § 391 special-interest route in a footnote. The corrected pages now say so, and the doctrinal point they were making survives it — the split is sharper with a state on the other side of it.

4. A parallel citation that belongs to a different opinion. Five pages cited IWP II as "133 Idaho 64, 982 P.2d 358." That P.2d page is the companion case's. IWP II is 982 P.2d 367. Corrected everywhere.

5. A "telling fact" that credited the court with a holding it declined to make. The Idaho state page told readers that when voters approved a 1998 amendment package "the state's own Supreme Court struck it down the next spring — courts in Idaho have treated Article IX as binding even on the voters." The first half is verified: H.J.R. 6 was approved November 3, 1998, and the writ issued the following spring. The second half is not. The court granted relief on Article 20, § 2 — the separate-vote requirement — expressly limited its review to "the methods and procedures utilized in the passage of H.J.R. 6," 133 Idaho at 57, and held the substantive challenges time barred. It said nothing about Article IX binding the electorate.

And one thing the Library had right, and had had right for over two months. The authorities register recorded the correct division between the two 1999 opinions on June 10, 2026, in a note that says in terms that "the auction/lessee-preference holdings belong to IWP I, 128 Idaho 761 (1996), and IWP II, 133 Idaho 64 (1999)." Chapter 4 of the treatise carries the correct account as well. The public pages were never brought into line with either. This is the second consecutive verification pass to find that the Library's research was sound and the step from register to page was where the error lived.

End of Idaho entry v2.