School Trust Lands: The Law of America's Educational Land Trusts

Appendix A — New Mexico (v2)

September 3, 2026 (case line built against the four full primary opinions held in the Library's collection, plus Ervien; first publication) Drafted with Claude, an AI system, and published by America's School Trust Library. Not legal advice.

About this appendix. The hornbook reads forward, from doctrine to cases. This appendix reads backward, from state to doctrine: New Mexico's school-trust cases are listed in bullet form, each entry cross-citing the hornbook sections it supports, so a practitioner can open her own state's entry and walk into the treatise from there. Every case below was read against the full primary opinion held in the Library's collection; claims that could not be resolved from a primary are flagged rather than asserted. New Mexico matters because it holds the strongest federal text in the country and, at the same time, the most restrictive answer in the country to the question of who may enforce it. The entry is organized around that pairing, because a reader who takes only the first half away from New Mexico will take away the wrong lesson.

Why this entry appears now, and what it withdraws. New Mexico was one of three states whose primary opinions the Library held but whose appendix had never been published. Building it disclosed that the Library's live pages had, for months, published a sentence attributed to Justice McKenna that does not appear in Ervien v. United States at all; that the Library's New Mexico case file stated Asplund v. Hannett's holding exactly backwards, describing an opinion the New Mexico Supreme Court itself withdrew; and that the treatise's most-quoted Ervien sentence is the reasoning of the trial court that was reversed, not the Supreme Court's own. What the build found is set out at the end. The corrections are in this pass; the record of them is in the corrections log.

NEW MEXICO

Granting instrument. Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557 — the New Mexico–Arizona Enabling Act. Sections 2, 16, 32 and 36 of every township for the support of common schools, with further grants to named institutions, each held as a distinct trust for the institution named. Section 10 is the operative paragraph and the strongest single paragraph of federal school-trust text in the country. The Supreme Court reads it as confining the proceeds as tightly as the land: "And to make assurance doubly sure it was provided that the natural products and money proceeds of such lands should be subject to the same trusts as the lands producing the same." Ervien v. United States, 251 U.S. 41, 47 (1919). And it reads the breach-of-trust clause as a bar to inference: "To preclude any license of construction or liberties of inference it was declared that the disposition of any of the lands or of the money or anything of value directly or indirectly derived therefrom for any object other than the enumerated ones should 'be deemed a breach of trust.'" Id. → §§ 2.4, 2.7; Appendix B.

New Mexico's Supreme Court states the section's three operative commands compactly, and this is the cleanest short statement of the 1910 architecture anywhere in the case law:

first, disposals of land are limited to the disposals described in the Enabling Act; second, land can only be sold or leased at a public auction to the highest and best bidder; and third, all sales and leases must yield at least the appraised value of the land.

State ex rel. King v. Lyons, 2011-NMSC-004, ¶ 7, 248 P.3d 878, 882-83. → §§ 2.4, 9.2.

An earlier federal grant, often conflated with the school grant. The Ferguson Act of June 21, 1898, 30 Stat. 484, made territorial grants for enumerated purposes including 500,000 acres "for the establishment of permanent water reservoirs for irrigating purposes," with the proceeds confined to a separate fund. Asplund v. Hannett is a reservoir-fund case decided under that grant as carried forward into the Enabling Act trust, not a common-school-fund case. Readers should not infer from it that the New Mexico Supreme Court has passed on standing to enforce the school trust. → § 13.4.

Constitutional reception and administering body. The 1911 New Mexico Constitution accepted the Act's terms by compact. Article XXI, section 9 consents to "the means and manner of enforcing such terms and conditions" — language the Supreme Court of New Mexico reads as "just as broad as the congressional provision, and no broader," Asplund, 31 N.M. 641, 646 (1926). The Commissioner of Public Lands is a single statewide elected fiduciary under Article XIII, and the permanent fund is established by Article XII. [VERIFY: the Library holds no primary text of N.M. Const. arts. XII, XIII, or XXI; the article assignments and the compact language above are taken from the courts' quotations of them in Asplund, Walker and Lyons, not from the constitution itself. Pull the constitutional text before quoting any provision directly.] [VERIFY: the November 2022 amendment adding early childhood education as a distribution destination, and the congressional-consent question it raises, are carried from the Library's state dossier and are not supported by any primary the Library holds.] → Ch. 3; Ch. 19.

Trustee, corpus, and distribution. [VERIFY: current Commissioner, Land Grant Permanent Fund corpus, annual distribution and remaining trust acreage are carried from the Library's state dossier and the New Mexico State Land Office, and are not supported by a primary in the collection. The Library's own New Mexico page and its structured data panel have disagreed with each other on the annual distribution figure; the prose has been conformed to the panel pending a sourced figure.] → Ch. 12.

The case line

1. Ervien v. United States, 251 U.S. 41 (1919) (McKenna, J.). The United States sued under section 10's enforcement clause to stop New Mexico from spending trust-land income on advertising. The state statute of March 8, 1915, passed over the Governor's veto, authorized the Commissioner of Public Lands to spend, as the Court quotes it at 46, "more than three cents on the dollar of the annual income of his office from sales and leases of lands" to make "known the resources and advantages of this State generally and particularly to homeseekers and investors." The District Court dismissed the bill; the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed with directions to enter a decree for the United States; the Supreme Court affirmed the reversal.

• Holding. "There is in the Enabling Act a specific enumeration of the purposes for which the lands were granted and the enumeration is necessarily exclusive of any other purpose." 251 U.S. at 47. "The dedication, we repeat, was special and exact, precluding any supplementary or aiding sense, in prophetic realization, it may be, that the State might be tempted to do that which it has done, lured from patient methods to speculative advertising in the hope of a speedy prosperity." Id. at 47-48. An indirect or eventual benefit to the trust therefore does not save an unenumerated use. → §§ 5.2, 6.2, 10.2, 15.2.
• The Court's answer to the eventual-benefit argument, at 48: the breach-of-trust language "means no more in the present case than that the United States, being the grantor of the lands, could impose conditions upon their use, and have the right to exact the performance of the conditions."
• ⚠ A sentence that must not be quoted as the Court's. The much-repeated line that a private proprietor's "wise administration of the property in him could not reach the odious dereliction of a breach of trust in the State," at 48, is the District Court's reasoning for dismissing the bill. That court was reversed and the Supreme Court declined to adopt the reasoning. Recited is not adopted.
• ⚠ A sentence that is not in the opinion at all. "The purposes must be regarded; they must be performed; they admit of no substitution; they admit of no addition" has circulated for years as an Ervien quotation, including on this Library's own pages. It does not appear in 251 U.S. 41. Two independent full reads of the opinion (2026-06-07 and 2026-09-03) confirm its absence. [VERIFY: the phrasing may derive from the Eighth Circuit's opinion below, United States v. Ervien, 246 F. 277 (8th Cir. 1917), which the Library does not hold. Until that opinion is pulled, the sentence may not be attributed to any court.]
• Pinning. The copy held carries U.S. Reports star pagination only, and the opinion text begins at *45 — pages 41 through 44 are the syllabus and counsel's arguments and are not in the copy. No pin to 41, 42, 43 or 44 can be produced from it. Producible range: 45-48.
• Words the opinion does not contain: loyalty, fiduciary, beneficiary, school, children. Ervien is a diversion case decided on the exclusivity of the enumerated purposes. Calling it the Supreme Court's "loyalty case" is a doctrinal label the Library supplies, not the Court's own.

2. Asplund v. Hannett, 31 N.M. 641, 249 P. 1074 (1926) (Watson, J., on rehearing, Aug. 16, 1926). A citizen and resident taxpayer sued the Governor, the state auditor and the state treasurer to enjoin the expenditure of the Ferguson Act reservoir-fund income on the State's Rio Grande litigation, alleging a breach of the congressional trust. The district court sustained a demurrer and dismissed. The Supreme Court's first opinion, filed December 21, 1925, ruled for the taxpayer and found a breach. On rehearing the court withdrew that opinion, sustained the Attorney General's motion to dismiss the appeal, and left the dismissal below standing. 31 N.M. at 667.

• Holding — the federal clause grants the citizen nothing. "Hence, neither in the Enabling Act nor in the Constitution do we locate the power of a citizen and taxpayer to sue for the enforcement of the trust provisions." 31 N.M. at 646. Congress "conferred no power, and imposed no duty upon [the] state or citizen. It simply recognized and consented to the power of the state to control its agencies, and recognized and consented to whatever rights a citizen of the state might have in the premises, under state laws." Id. The non-exclusivity clause is read as a disclaimer that grants nothing, not a reservation that confers something. → §§ 13.4, 14.2.
• Holding — a constitutional violation is not by itself a cause of action. "The constitutionality of a statute is not in itself a cause of action, nor a head of equity jurisdiction." Id. at 650. Such right as the citizen has "is political, enforc[e]able only as other political rights are maintainable." Id. at 650-51.
• Holding — the municipal-taxpayer analogy stops at the State. "A right which he shares, as a taxpayer, in common with all other taxpayers, is not such an individual right as qualifies him, under general principles, to relief by injunction," id. at 664; and "[t]he bridge which joins the private corporation and the municipal corporation, and enables the taxpayer to make that crossing, breaks down between the municipal corporation and the state," id. at 665.
• Holding — a public trust is still not an individual's to enforce. "When a trust is committed to a state, it must be in view of the fact that the trustee is constituted with three co-ordinate governmental branches. The execution of the trust is committed to all three within their respective spheres." Id. at 665-66. "It is often said that the possession and control of state property and funds is a public trust. So it is. But, by the better view, as we have sought to show, that does not entitle the individual to resort to equity in his own name and right to enforce it." Id. at 666.
• On the attorney general. "What may be the Attorney General's right or duty in the premises cannot be decisive. Even if the Constitution and statutes have failed to provide for any remedy, it is not for the courts to create one." Id. at 663. Note that section 10 names the United States Attorney General; Asplund does not channel enforcement to the State's attorney general. → § 14.3.
• Pinning. The copy held carries New Mexico Reports pagination only (31 N.M. 641-667). No pin to 249 P. can be produced from it. The copy also carries optical-recognition damage inside load-bearing sentences; quotations above are transcribed with the damage silently corrected only where the intended word is unambiguous, and no such passage should be block-quoted from the Library's copy without checking a clean text.
• ⚠ The opinion is internally inconsistent about which section of the Enabling Act carries the held-in-trust language, quoting it as "Section 28" and then citing "Enabling Act, § 10" for the Attorney General's duty. Report both; do not harmonize.

3. State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Walker, 61 N.M. 374, 301 P.2d 317 (1956) (McGhee, J., unanimous). The State Highway Commission sought a declaration that the Commissioner of Public Lands must give it rights-of-way across trust land, and sand and gravel for highway construction, free of charge. The district court dismissed for want of jurisdiction; the Supreme Court reached the merits and affirmed the dismissal, while announcing a prospective duty to pay.

• Holding. "These opinions would undoubtedly be correct as to lands the state might have acquired absent restrictions, but here we are dealing with lands granted in trust by the United States, under restrictions so exact they permit no license of construction or liberties of inference." 61 N.M. at 376. And: "The general law on the subject that an agency of the state is not to be charged for the use of state property unless specific provision be made therefor is not applicable." Id. → §§ 5.3, 10.3.
• On administrative construction — the non-deference point, stated precisely. "This practical construction given the Enabling Act by our executive department is very persuasive, and the weight of long administrative construction is well recognized by this Court." Id. at 380. But "long administrative interpretation is not sufficient to overcome them and that relator must henceforth compensate the trust for rights-of-way and construction material." Id. The court did not say that an attorney general's advice carries no weight; it said the weight is real and insufficient. → § 14.4.
• Three attorney general opinions disapproved, not two: Op. No. 3454 (1922), Op. No. 64 (1931), and Op. No. 677 (1933), the last reaffirming the second. [VERIFY: the Library holds none of the three in their own text; they are described as the Walker opinion describes them.] → § 14.4.
• On Arizona. "Notwithstanding our high regard for the Arizona Supreme Court and its decisions, we feel their cases are based on the strained reasoning and inferences condemned in the opinions in United States v. Ervien, supra." Id. at 379. → Appendix A — Arizona.
• ⚠ What Walker does not hold. It fixes no full-value measure — the statutory floor is the minimum sale price, and the court never reached fair market or appraised value. It orders no restoration and awards nothing; the duty announced is prospective ("henceforth"). And it expressly relieves highway easements and highway sand and gravel of the Act's advertising requirement, so the framework is applied to the state's own works less strictly than to private disposition, not "as forcefully."
• Pinning. ⚠ The copy held carries neither reporter's star pagination. The page numbers above are derived from a consistent internal offset and are given for the reader's convenience; no Walker pin can be certified from the Library's copy, and none should be represented as verified until a paginated copy is obtained.

4. Forest Guardians v. Powell, 2001-NMCA-028, 130 N.M. 368, 24 P.3d 803, cert. denied, No. 26,915 (N.M. May 22, 2001) (Pickard, J.; Alarid, J., concurring; Bustamante, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Three conservation organizations and four parents of public schoolchildren challenged State Land Office leasing rules and practices. The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal for lack of standing — but the two groups lost on different grounds, and the distinction is the most misreported fact about the case.

• Trust character, affirmed. "The Enabling Act, the New Mexico State Constitution, and case law make it clear that the lands granted under the Act as well as the profits to be derived from these lands are to be held in trust for the benefit of named institutions." ¶ 8. And: "The Act made it clear that actions taken in contravention of any provision of the Act would constitute a breach of the trust." ¶ 6. → § 4.2.
• The charitable-trust characterization. "[W]e conclude that the intended beneficiary of the federal land grants is the general citizenry of the State, and that the purpose of the grants was to insure a source of funding to support the construction and maintenance of essential social institutions." ¶ 9. → § 13.4.
• The standing categories, quoted exactly. "Traditionally, three categories of persons have such standing: (1) the state attorney general or other public officer, (2) a trustee as against co-trustees, and (3) persons having a special interest in the enforcement of the trust." ¶ 10. → §§ 13.4, 14.2.
• The schoolchildren. Denied — but the court first accepted that they showed injury in fact and were "arguably within the zone of interests" the Act protects, ¶¶ 23-24, and denied standing on causation and redressability, because New Mexico's multi-fund school-budgeting process breaks the link between trust income and any school's or child's funding, ¶¶ 25-32. This is not a "beneficiaries suffer no injury" holding, and it should not be cited as one. → §§ 13.4, 16.3.
• The conservation groups. Denied on a different ground — outside the zone of interests, having conceded that the Act's provisions run to the trust and its institutions, ¶¶ 19-22. Their claim was framed as vindicating "the right of the school lands trust beneficiaries to the undivided loyalty of the Land Office and to the maximization of profits derived from the leasing of the trust lands," ¶ 21. → § 13.5.
• The channeling is practical, not exclusive. "The Enabling Act expanded the group of persons entitled to enforce the trust. . . . However, in establishing this duty, the Act provided that '[n]othing herein contained shall be taken as in limitation of the power of the state or of any citizen thereof to enforce the provisions of this act.'" ¶ 11. And: "With respect to private citizens, we are deciding only the narrow issue before us, namely whether public schoolchildren have a 'special interest' in the enforcement of the trust such that standing would be justified." ¶ 11. → § 14.2.
• The dissent, quoted in full where the Library formerly truncated it. "The majority opinion applies our standing case law too cautiously and in the process essentially voids that provision of Section 10 of the Enabling Act which reserves the 'power . . . of any citizen [of the State] to enforce the provisions of this act.' If schoolchildren — the real beneficiaries of the Act — cannot bring suit as citizens, no citizen can." ¶ 38 (Bustamante, J.). → § 13.6.
• Pinning. Paragraph numbers ¶¶ 1-42 are complete and paragraph pins are fully producible. ⚠ Star pages are not. No pin to 130 N.M. or 24 P.3d can be produced from the Library's copy. The copy is also optical-recognition damaged in ways that will silently corrupt a block quotation ("this ease" for this case, "them brief" for their brief); every quotation above has been character-corrected against context and should be re-checked against a clean text before print.
• ⚠ A cross-state citation trap — resolved September 6, 2026. At ¶ 17 Powell cites Forest Guardians v. Wells, 197 Ariz. 511, 4 P.3d 1054 (App. 2000) — the Arizona Court of Appeals decision — parenthetically as "upholding decisions of Arizona State Land Office Commissioner to deny the appellants' grazing lease applications." The Arizona Supreme Court decision of the same name, 201 Ariz. 255, 34 P.3d 364 (2001), came down later the same year and vacated it: "The court of appeals' opinion is vacated and the superior court's judgment is reversed." ¶ 28. Powell was decided in April 2001 and was correct when written; its parenthetical is simply no longer a true statement of Arizona law. Nothing in Powell turns on it. The Wells citation is a "see also" attached to an aside — that a disappointed applicant would have standing to appeal a specific adverse action — which Powell rests on NMSA 1978, § 19-7-67 and repeats at ¶ 19 without citing Wells at all; the conservation groups lost on zone-of-interests grounds at ¶¶ 18-19. The Arizona Supreme Court never reached standing, so the vacatur cannot undercut the borrowed proposition; it confirms it, having reached the merits of that very appeal and reversed in the applicants' favor. A sweep of the Library's substrate found no proposition resting on the vacated opinion: "197 Ariz. 511" appears nowhere except in this note. → Appendix A — Arizona.

5. State ex rel. King v. Lyons, 2011-NMSC-004, 149 N.M. 330, 248 P.3d 878 (Bosson, J.; Serna and Maes, JJ., concurring; Chávez, J., dissenting, joined by Daniels, C.J.). The Attorney General petitioned for an original writ of mandamus against the Commissioner of Public Lands, challenging four negotiated exchanges of White Peak-area trust land with private neighboring landowners. The writ issued, 3-2.

• Holding — no residual exchange power. "We conclude that the exchanges are not authorized because they violate the requirements of the Enabling Act, and therefore we issue our Writ of Mandamus in the manner requested by the Attorney General, directing the Land Commissioner to cancel these exchanges." ¶ 2, 248 P.3d at 881. An exchange measured in appraised monetary value is an in-kind sale: "any exchange authority is subject to the same restrictions that apply to all sales governed by Section 10: public notice, a public auction with sale to the highest and best bidder, and sale at a price no less than appraised value." ¶ 56, at 893. → §§ 9.3, 10.4, 19.4.
• Holding — the disposition duty is ministerial. "If he does decide to sell (or exchange) land, however, the Land Commissioner has an enforceable, ministerial duty to comply with the sales provisions of Section 10 of the Enabling Act. He has no discretion to do otherwise." ¶ 30, at 887. And: "Any infraction of the Act's limited bounds is prohibited as a 'breach of trust.'" ¶ 35, at 888. → §§ 4.3, 16.2.
• Holding — private negotiation defeats an auction as a matter of law. "As a matter of law, private negotiation negates the required competition. . . . When the Land Commissioner chooses to dispose of land, he must do so by a true public auction." ¶ 86, at 901. Two of the four exchanges had gone through a published sealed-bid process and still failed, because extended pre-auction negotiation with a single applicant left no real competition. → § 9.4.
• Remedy. "[T]he Stanley Ranch and the UU Bar Ranch exchanges are null and void and must be cancelled," ¶ 87, at 901 — including transfers of title — and the remaining two were halted. → § 18.3.
• ⚠ Prospective only. "[W]e apply our writ and the reasoning behind it only to the exchanges challenged by the Attorney General in this case and not to any exchanges that may have taken place in the past." ¶ 89, at 901-02. A hostile reader will surface this; state it first.
• ⚠ What Lyons is not. It is not a full-value case. The four exchanges would have returned the trust more appraised value than it gave up, ¶ 11. Citing Lyons for the proposition that a disposition below full value is void inverts it: the case voided transactions that satisfied the value floor and failed the auction.
• ⚠ The strongest fiduciary language is in the dissent. The private-trustee-duty discussion and the undivided-loyalty material at ¶¶ 102-103 are Chávez, J., dissenting, and must never be quoted as the Court. The majority's trust-character statements are at ¶¶ 5 and 35. → § 4.2.
• Who enforced it. The Attorney General appeared as relator "on behalf of state interests — state trust land and the beneficiaries of the trust — as the office requires," ¶ 25, at 886, and was expressly not personally aggrieved. Read against Asplund and Powell, New Mexico's enforcement record is: the federal Attorney General once, in 1919; the state Attorney General once, in 2011; and private beneficiaries never. → §§ 14.3, 15.2.
• Pinning. Paragraph numbers ¶¶ 1-124 and P.3d star pages *881-*912 are both producible. ⚠ N.M. Reports pins are not — "149 N.M. 330" appears in the Library's copy only in harvester metadata, never in the court's text. ⚠ Every em dash in the copy is stored as a raw control byte; a verbatim copy-paste across one silently joins two words.

What New Mexico teaches

New Mexico is the field's cleanest demonstration that text and access are separate variables. Section 10 is the strongest school-trust paragraph Congress ever wrote, and the New Mexico courts have enforced it seriously every time it has been put to them: Ervien struck a diversion of three cents on the dollar; Walker made the State's own highway program pay the trust; Lyons unwound consummated land exchanges by mandamus and cancelled transfers of title. Not one of those cases was brought by a beneficiary. Every one was brought by an attorney general. And when beneficiaries have come to the courthouse themselves — a taxpayer in 1926, schoolchildren and their parents in 2001 — New Mexico has turned them away, in Asplund on the ground that the federal clause confers nothing on the citizen and in Powell on the ground that a charitable trust's enforcement lies elsewhere and that state school finance breaks the causal chain besides.

The practical lesson for a state considering New Mexico as a model is therefore two-sided, and the second side is the one usually dropped. Strong text plus a named enforcer produced a strong record — while the enforcer chose to enforce. Nothing in New Mexico law supplies a remedy when he does not. Judge Bustamante put the objection in the form it will keep: if the schoolchildren "cannot bring suit as citizens, no citizen can." ¶ 38.

What the build found

★ Finding 1 — a fabricated Supreme Court quotation, published. The Library's New Mexico page carried, as its pull-quote, "The purposes must be regarded; they must be performed; they admit of no substitution; they admit of no addition," attributed to Ervien v. United States (1919). The sentence is not in the opinion. The Library's own book-side citation map had recorded its absence since June 7, 2026 and banned it from the Stewards manuscript; the ban never reached the public pages. The same sentence was published a second time, in the Reading Room, attributed to Justice McKenna by name and footnoted to 251 U.S. 41, 46-47. Both are replaced with the Court's actual holding sentence at 47.

★ Finding 2 — a holding stated exactly backwards, published. The Library's Asplund v. Hannett case file said the New Mexico Supreme Court "held that the Ferguson Act framework created an enforceable trust binding on the State and that taxpayer-citizen plaintiffs had standing to enforce the trust," and called the case "the early-twentieth-century foundational authority for beneficiary-aligned standing." The court held the opposite, dismissed the appeal, and withdrew the earlier opinion that had said what the Library's page said. The page was describing a withdrawn opinion as the law. Rebuilt from the primary.

★ Finding 3 — the treatise's most-quoted Ervien sentence belongs to the court that lost. "[C]ould not reach the odious dereliction of a breach of trust in the State," 251 U.S. at 48, is the District Court's reasoning for dismissing the bill. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that court and the Supreme Court affirmed the reversal. Six substrate locations presented the sentence as the Supreme Court's answer, five of them adding that the Court was "affirming its result" — which is false in the plainest way: the District Court's result was reversed. One location, in the federal-enforcement chapter, carried no hedge at all. The Court's actual answer, the grantor-conditions sentence at 48, appeared in none of the ninety-five substrate lines citing the case. All corrected; the grantor-conditions holding is now the quoted one.

★ Finding 4 — Walker read as more than it holds, in three directions. It was shelved in the treatise's full-value collection (it fixes no full-value measure), in the restoration collection (it ordered no restoration and awarded nothing), and it was said to apply the trust framework "as forcefully as to private disposition" (it expressly relieved highway easements of the Act's advertising requirement). A fourth error inverted the court's own words: the treatise said an attorney general's advice "carries no weight against the trust when tested," where the court called the executive construction "very persuasive" and merely insufficient. Opposing counsel could have quoted the opinion against the treatise sentence verbatim.

★ Finding 5 — two attorney general opinions where there are three. Eleven substrate lines said Walker disapproved Opinions 3454 (1922) and 64 (1931). The opinion discusses and rejects a third, Opinion 677 (1933). The Library's own authorities register had recorded all three since it was built; the chapters were never reconciled to it. This is the same failure mode as the Idaho rebuild found in pass 80 — the register right, the prose never brought into line.

★ Finding 6 — Powell used against its own text. Two chapters said the court denied standing "across the board" on the charitable-trust theory. It did not: the conservation groups lost on zone of interests, and the schoolchildren lost on causation and redressability after the court accepted their injury in fact and their zone-of-interests standing. The treatise was discarding the most useful thing in the case — a court finding that beneficiary schoolchildren are injured by trust mismanagement — and replacing it with a broader adverse holding the court declined to make. A third error read the case as making the attorney general the enforcer "by everyone else's exclusion," where ¶ 11 preserves the federal Attorney General, the State as trustee, and any special-interest holder, and says the court decides "only the narrow issue before us."

★ Finding 7 — a Restatement quotation missing a word. The standing categories were quoted as "(1) the attorney general or other public officer"; ¶ 10 reads "(1) the state attorney general or other public officer." In a chapter about which attorney general may sue, the dropped word is the one that matters.

★ Finding 8 — Lyons shelved as a full-value case. The four exchanges would have delivered the trust more appraised value than it gave up. Lyons voided them for want of a true auction. Citing it for a full-value rule invites a hostile reader to open the opinion at ¶ 11 and read the numbers.

A pinning hazard worth the register's attention. New Mexico is now the collection's second-worst-pinning state after Idaho, and for a different reason: three of the four state copies cannot produce the pins the treatise uses. Asplund carries New Mexico Reports pages only, so no 249 P. pin is verifiable. Walker carries neither reporter's pagination — the page numbers in this appendix are derived, and are marked as such. Powell carries paragraph numbers but no star pages of any kind. Only Lyons supports two citation forms, and even there the N.M. Reports pin cannot be produced. Every affected pin is flagged where it is used rather than silently asserted.

Acquisitions, in priority order. (1) United States v. Ervien, 246 F. 277 (8th Cir. 1917) — the opinion below, and the only plausible source of the sentence that has been circulating as Ervien's for years. Until it is held, the Library cannot say where the sentence came from, only that it is not the Supreme Court's. (2) N.M. Const. arts. XII, XIII and XXI in their own text — no held primary quotes any of them, and three Library surfaces describe them. (3) N.M. Att'y Gen. Ops. No. 3454 (1922), No. 64 (1931) and No. 677 (1933) — the field's clearest documented instance of a state law office siding with the sovereign against the trust, and the Library knows them only through the opinion that rejected them. (4) Paginated copies of Walker and Powell — the treatise cannot produce a verifiable pin in either. (5) Lake Arthur Drainage District v. Field, 27 N.M. 183, 199 P. 112 (1921), cited in the Library's Reading Room and unheld. (6) The 1910 Enabling Act's own text, for section 10 verbatim rather than as the courts quote it.

Appendix A — New Mexico (v2). Built 2026-09-03 against Ervien v. United States, 251 U.S. 41 (1919); Asplund v. Hannett, 31 N.M. 641 (1926); State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Walker, 61 N.M. 374 (1956); Forest Guardians v. Powell, 2001-NMCA-028; and State ex rel. King v. Lyons, 2011-NMSC-004 — each read in full. Claims that could not be resolved from a primary carry a [VERIFY] flag and are not asserted. Corrections arising from this build are recorded in the Library's corrections log.