School Trust Lands: The Law of America's Educational Land Trusts

Appendix A — South Dakota (v2)

Built September 9, 2026 against the three full primary opinions held in the Library's collection, plus the one sister-state citation the Library can verify; independently re-checked September 10, 2026; first publication. Drafted with Claude, an AI system, and published by America's School Trust Library. Not legal advice.

About this appendix. The hornbook reads forward, from doctrine to cases. This appendix reads backward, from state to doctrine: South Dakota's school-trust cases are listed in bullet form, each entry cross-citing the hornbook sections it supports, so a practitioner can open her own state's entry and walk into the treatise from there. Every case below was read against the full primary opinion held in the Library's collection; claims that could not be resolved from a primary are flagged rather than asserted.

Why South Dakota is worth a reader's time. Most states give a reader one opinion — the one where the beneficiary wins and the court says the trust is real. South Dakota gives the whole arc. The Kanaly litigation ran to three published opinions in twenty-one months, and read in order they answer the three questions a beneficiary actually faces. Is the transfer unlawful? Yes (1985). Who pays the lawyer who proved it? The citizen does: costs are awarded, fees are not (February 1987). Was the trust ever made whole? The court says so — in one sentence, with no figure, no date and no citation attached (March 1987). The middle answer is the one the field most often omits, and it is the reason this entry treats Kanaly II as a case of first importance rather than a footnote to Kanaly I.

Why this entry appears now, and what it withdraws. South Dakota was the last state whose primary opinions the Library held but whose appendix had never been published. Building it required withdrawing claims from the Library's own internal draft and from pages the Library already publishes — a sister-state citation the draft overstated, a set of quotation marks placed around words the South Dakota court was reporting rather than adopting, a characterization of the opinion's sources that the opinion does not bear, and, most seriously, a remedy the court never ordered. It also withdrew a quotation from the Library's internal authorities register that is not in the opinion it was attributed to. What the build found is set out at the end. The corrections are in this pass; the record of them is in the corrections log.

SOUTH DAKOTA

Granting instrument. Omnibus Enabling Act of February 22, 1889, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676 — the single act admitting South Dakota, North Dakota, Montana and Washington. Section 11 required that no granted land, or estate or interest in it, be disposed of unless "the full market value of the estate or interest disposed of, to be ascertained in such manner as may be provided by law, has been paid or safely secured to the state"; section 17 granted 80,000 acres for the state normal schools, among other named-institution grants, each with its own beneficiary. [VERIFY: the Act's own text is not held in this collection. The Library reads it here only as quoted inside the three Kanaly opinions and inside Conservation Northwest. The customary description of the common-school grant as sections 16 and 36 of every township, and the appraisal and minimum-price provisions the Library's state dossier attributes to §§ 10–11, 14 and 17, are not established by any primary held here — and note that where Conservation Northwest refers to "Sections 16 and 17," it means sections of the Enabling Act, not sections of a township.]

⚠ An optical-recognition trap in the Library's own copy. Kanaly I block-quotes Enabling Act § 11, and in the held copy the word "easements" is broken across a page break and scanned as "ease-merits" — the text reads "grant such ease-" / "merits or rights." Do not quote § 11 from the Library's copy of Kanaly I; take the statutory text from the Act itself, which the Library does not yet hold. → § 2.4; Appendix B.

Constitutional reception and administering body. South Dakota was admitted in November 1889 [VERIFY: no held primary gives the day; the Library's dossier says November 2], and its Constitution, adopted in 1889, carried the trust forward in its own terms. Article VIII, § 7 is the operative provision. Kanaly I block-quotes it in full at 823, and the full text is worth having, because its last clause is the most useful sentence in the section for a beneficiary:

All lands, money or other property donated, granted or received from the United States or any other source for a university, agricultural college, normal schools or other educational or charitable institution or purpose, and the proceeds of all such lands and other property so received from any source, shall be and remain perpetual funds, the interest and income of which, together with the rents of all such lands as may remain unsold, shall be inviolably appropriated and applied to the specific objects of the original grants or gifts. The principal of every such fund may be increased, but shall never be diminished, and the interest and income only shall be used. Every such fund shall be deemed a trust fund held by the state, and the state shall make good all losses therefrom that shall in any manner occur.

⚠ A shorter form of § 7 circulates, and it is not the constitutional text. The words "shall remain perpetual funds, and shall be inviolably used for the specific objects of the original gifts" are Kanaly I's own summary of the section at 822, not its language — which is why the Washington Supreme Court, quoting Kanaly, reproduces the summary rather than the provision. The summary drops "shall be and remain," drops "appropriated and applied," and drops the make-good clause entirely. Quote the block above, not the summary.

Article VIII, § 8 is, in the South Dakota court's own words, "simply a companion section to § 7" — a point Kanaly III settled rather than analyzed independently.

[VERIFY: that the trust is administered by the Office of School and Public Lands under an elected Commissioner of School and Public Lands, and the current corpus, distribution and remaining trust acreage, are carried from the Library's state dossier and are not established by any primary held here.] → Ch. 3.

Why South Dakota matters to the field. Three contributions, in descending order of how often they are needed.

1. Kanaly I states the uncompensated-transfer rule more squarely than any other opinion in this collection: a legislature may move trust property between its own agencies, but not for free.

2. Kanaly II answers the question that decides whether the first rule is ever enforced — who pays the citizen's lawyer — and answers it against the citizen.

3. Kanaly I draws a line the field tends to blur, between the fund and the institution: the trust protects the principal of the fund — its corpus — and not any particular school.

The cases

• Kanaly v. State by and through Janklow (Kanaly I), 368 N.W.2d 819 (S.D. 1985) (No. 14716, decided May 29, 1985).

  • ⚠ A caption caution. Sources cite this litigation under three different forms of the party name, and the Library's held copies cannot settle which the bound reporter prints: none of the three copies contains a reporter caption at all — each opens at the author line. The Washington Supreme Court cites the first opinion as Kanaly v. State ex rel. Janklow; Kanaly II's own text cites it as Kanaly v. State By and Through Janklow; Kanaly III calls it simply Kanaly v. State. The forms used in this entry follow the Library's catalog record. [VERIFY: the printed reporter captions, against the bound volumes.]
  • Posture. Senate Bill 221 of 1984 (1984 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 138), signed March 9, 1984, closed the University of South Dakota at Springfield, converted it to a minimum-security prison, and transferred control of the facilities from the Board of Regents to the Board of Charities and Corrections without consideration. Six resident citizens and taxpayers — Van Cleave, McBride, Konechne, Lihs, Wolf and Kanaly — challenged it. Wolf was additionally a student who had not completed his program; Kanaly a tenured faculty member. The circuit court granted an alternative writ of prohibition — an order directing the state to halt — then vacated it except for the provision preventing sale of the campus, and later held even that piece moot because no conveyance had been made before the May 1, 1984 deadline. It then granted the defendants partial summary judgment. This is an appeal from that judgment.
  • Holdings. Henderson, J., for a unanimous court. The trust holding, at 823: "That these provisions create a special, permanent and perpetual trust of all land, money, property, and proceeds of the same, donated to the state for educational institutions by the United States and individuals alike and that the state is the trustee is beyond question." The provisions referred to are Enabling Act §§ 11 and 17 together with Article VIII, § 7, all three of which the court had just quoted. And, at 823-24, the beneficiary class: "The beneficiaries of this trust, compact, and contract created and established by the Enabling Act and the South Dakota Constitution are the various educational institutions of this state." The exclusion, at 824, is the more useful half: "The beneficiaries do not include the general public, other governmental institutions, nor the general welfare of this state."
  • The rule the case is cited for, at 824: "In the present case, we also declare the legislative transfer of trust property to another state governmental agency, without compensating or reimbursing the trust fund for the full market value of the transferred property, to be unconstitutional and in violation of the Enabling Act." Its bounds, same page: "Although the legislature is empowered to convey, convert, or transfer trust property, it cannot do so in a manner that diminishes the trust fund's principal. It is the duty of the state, as trustee, to preserve the fund's principal and thus it cannot give away trust property." And the price of any disposition: "Therefore, any disposition of the land, buildings, or other property or interests of the former University of South Dakota-Springfield must be made for the full market value and the proceeds delivered to the trust."
  • The dual-source rule, footnote 1 at 824, which the Library's earlier draft omitted and which matters wherever trust corpus has mixed provenance: "The legislature's gratuitous transfer of the land granted by the United States violates the perpetual trust provisions of both the Enabling Act and the South Dakota Constitution, whereas the legislature's gratuitous transfer of the land deeded by John A. Burbank in 1883 violates the trust provisions of the South Dakota Constitution only." A lawyer citing Kanaly for Enabling Act protection of privately donated corpus will be met with that footnote: both sources are protected, but not by the same instrument.
  • The limiting principle — quote it yourself before opposing counsel does, at 824: "A perpetual trust fund for school purposes is one thing; a perpetual school is quite another." The court held expressly that "[t]he existence at the City of Springfield of an institution of higher education is not required by the Enabling Act or the constitution of this state," and that closure and conversion were permissible provided the trust fund was not thereby impaired. Kanaly protects the fund. It does not protect the campus.
  • Standing, at 827: "However, ownership, special interest, or injury is not a prerequisite to litigate a case such as this, involving public funds." The court reversed the trial court on standing, quoting State ex rel. Jensen v. Kelly, 65 S.D. 345, 347, 274 N.W. 319, 321 (1937): "It has become the settled law of this state that a taxpayer need not have a special interest in an action or proceedings nor suffer special injury to himself to entitle him to institute an action to protect public rights." Read the win narrowly: the court reversed the ruling that the plaintiffs lacked standing to raise the bond-impairment claim while affirming that the claim itself was not yet ripe, the bonds being neither in default nor able to become so until March 1986.
  • ⚠ Disposition — and the limits of the remedy. This is the paragraph most often got wrong. This was not a clean win. Five issues were decided; the appellants prevailed on two. The disposition, at 829: "As hereinbefore expressed, we affirm in part, reverse in part, modify in part, and remand for proceedings consistent with this decision." No injunction issued, no money judgment was entered, no compensation was ordered and no restoration was ordered. What the court did order was a valuation, at 825 and again at 829: "we remand to the trial court to conduct hearings concerning the extent and nature of all property and interests transferred to the Board of Charities and Corrections from the Board of Regents and its full market value." The correction itself it left to the legislature, at 824: "To correct these legal impediments, the legislature will have to reimburse the trust fund for the full market value of the property and interests transferred to the Board of Charities and Corrections from USD/S [the University of South Dakota at Springfield]. Whether this should be done through an appropriation or other additional legislation is a determination for the legislature." Its only lever was a deadline, at 825: "If the legislature does not provide for the reimbursement of the trust fund by the end of the 1986 legislative session, proceedings may be commenced to seek appropriate relief from the unconstitutionality of this legislation." Any brief citing Kanaly I for a remedy has to say which of those things it means. And note what the same court said about that remand two years later, in Kanaly II at 554: it "did not make the educational fund a trust administered through the court. . . . It remained a trust under the control and management of the legislature."
  • ⚠ What this case is not, and pin cautions. The opinion body carries no caption and never names Janklow; the name reaches the citation through the reporter, not the text. The held copy's star markers — the printed reporter's page breaks, carried into the electronic text — run 822 through 829; pages 819-821 carry no marker of their own. Page 821 is nonetheless recoverable: the structural labels inside the Library's copy place the opinion's opening passages, the statement of the action and of the parties, on that page, and the Washington Supreme Court pins the same constitutional passage at 368 N.W.2d 819, 821-22. Pages 819-820 are, on the ordinary arrangement of a reported opinion, caption, syllabus and counsel; the copy does not establish that. All eight page breaks fall mid-sentence, one of them mid-word, so any quotation crossing one needs a span pin — a citation to both pages rather than one. One headline sentence at 824 carries optical-recognition damage — "Neither can this state legislature give away lands ór permanent funds created for the support and maintenance of the public schools" — where "ór" should read "or"; quote it with the correction marked, or not at all. Two further damaged passages sit inside block quotations at 828-29: "[Wjhile the subject must be single" for "[W]hile," and "filed prior to the 1st day of July last_" with a trailing underscore for a period.
  • ⚠ What the opinion does not do. It does not synthesize a national body of law, and the Library's earlier draft said it did. In its own voice it cites five authorities from outside South Dakota — Nigh, Andrus, Platte Valley, Ervien and Murphy — four of them in a single paragraph at 823-24 and the fifth opening the next, against more than twenty South Dakota authorities. (Three further out-of-state cases appear inside a block quotation at 828-29 and concern emergency clauses and referendum petitions, not trust doctrine.) It does not cite Lassen, or Nebraska's Ebke or Propst. It could not have cited Arizona's Deer Valley, which was decided later. [VERIFY: the Deer Valley date is carried from the Library's Arizona entry; no primary held here establishes it.] The Nebraska case Kanaly does cite is State v. Platte Valley Public Power & Irrigation District, 147 Neb. 289, 296, 23 N.W.2d 300, 306 (1946).
  • ⚠ The three descriptors, correctly attributed. Attribute the adjectives to the courts that used them, not to Kanaly. The opinion is often quoted as calling the grant an "irrevocable compact," a "solemn agreement," and a "contract." It does not adopt those descriptions; it reports them, at 823: "Other courts have also recognized the trust relationship created by Federal Enabling Legislation and state acceptance of educational lands pursuant thereto. Such a procedure has been said to create an 'irrevocable compact,' Oklahoma Educ. Ass'n, Inc. v. Nigh, 642 P.2d 230, 235 (Okla. 1982); a 'solemn agreement,' Andrus v. Utah, 446 U.S. 500, 507 . . . (1980) . . .; and a 'contract' between the accepting state and the United States, State v. Platte Valley Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 147 Neb. 289, 296, 23 N.W.2d 300, 306 . . . (1946)." Three points follow. Only the three quoted descriptions sit inside quotation marks; "between the accepting state and the United States" is Kanaly's own gloss. The subject is "such a procedure" — federal enabling legislation plus state acceptance — not "the school land grant." And do not overcorrect: the court's very next sentence speaks in its own voice of "this trust, compact, and contract," so it does adopt the nouns compact and contract, while "irrevocable" and "solemn agreement" never appear in its own voice. (Ellipses in the passage above mark citation material omitted from the string, including the Andrus subsequent history.)
  • Supports: Ch. 3 (constitutional reception; Art. VIII §§ 7-8); § 4.3 (constitutional incorporation); § 4.6(a) (statutes effecting a breach are void); § 4.6(d) (the state pays full value when it deals with itself); Ch. 9 (the full-value rule); § 10.3 (state analogues — the lead legislative-transfer case in this collection); § 13.3 (plaintiff classes — taxpayer standing without special injury); Ch. 18 (remedies, and their limits).

• Kanaly v. State ex rel. Janklow (Kanaly II), 401 N.W.2d 551 (S.D. 1987) (decided February 25, 1987).

  • Posture. The Board of Regents and Board of Charities and Corrections appealed a circuit court order requiring them to pay $17,919.87 in attorneys' fees, costs and expenses incurred by the plaintiffs who had prevailed in part in Kanaly I. No fee request had been pleaded in the complaint. Counsel moved for $43,491.88; the circuit court cut the hourly rate to $65.00 and awarded $17,919.87. The trial court had grounded the award on three common-law exceptions to the American rule that each side pays its own lawyer — the common-fund doctrine, the substantial-benefit doctrine, and the trust-administration rule.
  • What happened to the Kanaly I remedy. The court's own account, at 551-52, corrects a natural assumption: "Shortly before Kanaly I was handed down however, the South Dakota Legislature by statute transferred the USD/S trust land and funds to the remaining state normal schools. Merkwan v. State by and through Janklow, 375 N.W.2d 624 (S.D. 1985). Pursuant to our decision in Kanaly I, that enactment obviated any need for plaintiffs' requested relief from the unconstitutional transfer." The curative statute preceded the decision. Do not write that the legislature responded to Kanaly I.
  • Holdings. Fosheim, Retired Justice. The statutory fee rule is exclusive and defeats every equitable theory, at 553: "Regardless of their merits, the simple and clear obstacle preventing their application is their failure to be specifically provided for by any statute. They are thus prohibited by SDCL 15-17-7." (SDCL is the South Dakota Codified Laws.) And the doctrinal crux, at 554: "It follows that the phrase 'trusts administered through the court' found in SDCL 15-17-7 refers to SDCL ch. 21-22, 'Administration of Trust Estates' and not to the South Dakota educational trust fund." A remand does not change that: "It remained a trust under the control and management of the legislature." The court quoted Heston v. Mayhew, 9 S.D. 501, 502, 70 N.W. 635, 636 (1897): "[i]t is the duty of the legislature to direct and control the management of such trust."
  • The proposition the field needs most, at 553, quoting Van Emmerik on Carlson v. City of Faith: South Dakota has "impliedly rejected the concept of an extra-statutory award of attorneys' fees for the redress of a public wrong." Stated plainly: in South Dakota the citizen who successfully sues to protect the school-land trust recovers her costs and pays her own lawyer; the trust's principal — its corpus — contributes nothing. This is the enforcement-cost gap in its clearest judicial form, and it belongs wherever the treatise asks why breaches go unlitigated.
  • Disposition, at 554: "The order of the trial court is reversed and remanded for a calculation and allowance of costs only." Costs survive; fees do not. In figures: counsel asked $43,491.88; the trial court cut the hourly rate and awarded $17,919.87; the Supreme Court struck the fee entirely and sent the case back for costs alone. The citizen who proved the breach left with his out-of-pocket costs and nothing for his lawyer's time. ⚠ The breakdown of the trial court's award into $15,941.25 of fees and $1,978.62 of costs and related expenses appears only in Henderson, J.'s dissent, at 556 n.2 — not in the court's opinion. Attribute it accordingly. The majority prints the total once, and prints it damaged: "$17,-919.87."
  • Composition. "WUEST, C.J., and MORGAN and SABERS, JJ., concur." "HENDERSON, J., dissents." "MILLER, J., not having been a member of the Court at the time this action was submitted to the Court, did not participate." A 4-1 decision. Note who dissented: Henderson, J., wrote Kanaly I. The author of the trust holding would have paid the plaintiffs out of the fund they preserved. Two of his sentences — dissent, not holding — at 555 and 556: "The legislature was not, is not, and never will be separately and singularly charged with absolute control of this trust." "Plaintiffs have done this state a great service by acting to protect a vital and 'sacred' educational trust and reimbursement should be made from the fund they were so successful in preserving."
  • ⚠ Pin caution. The held copy's star pages run 553 through 556. Page 551 — caption, counsel, syllabus — and the 551/552 break are absent. Cite anything before the 553 marker as 401 N.W.2d at 551-52 unless checked against the bound reporter. The word "attorneys" is itself broken across the 553 page break. Optical-recognition damage also affects the block quotation from Schelle and Ruth inside the dissent at 555 ("set-tled_" for "settled."; "mil" for "will") and the word "derrogation" at 553; do not quote from those passages without verification.
  • Supports: § 18.6 (fee-shifting — the counter-answer to Montana); Ch. 13 (who may sue, and at whose expense); Ch. 4 (a trust does not become court-administered by being remanded).

• Kanaly v. State by and through Janklow (Kanaly III), 403 N.W.2d 33 (S.D. 1987) (per curiam) (decided March 25, 1987).

  • Posture. Not a rehearing. In the opinion's own words: "This is an appeal from an order dismissing intervenor Ethel Hagen's second amended complaint. We affirm." Heege, Circuit Judge, sat for Miller, J., disqualified.
  • The sentence the whole line turns on. "In Kanaly I, we concluded that S.B. 221 would not violate Article VIII, § 7 of the South Dakota Constitution so long as the legislature reimbursed the perpetual trust fund provided for in § 7 for the full value of the property and interest transferred to the Board of Charities and Corrections. This has been done." That is the entire record of compliance, and it needs three cautions. ⚠ The court gives no figure, no date and no evidentiary citation for "This has been done." ⚠ Read it against Kanaly II, which describes the curative event as a legislative transfer of the land and funds to the remaining normal schools rather than as a payment; the two accounts are not obviously the same act, and no held primary reconciles them. ⚠ Note also that this sentence restates Kanaly I in the conditional — S.B. 221 "would not violate" § 7 so long as the legislature reimbursed — where Kanaly I's own conclusion at 829 was flat: "we specifically hold that S.B. 221 does violate the permanent trust fund provisions of the Enabling Act and South Dakota Constitution Article VIII, § 7." It is nonetheless the only statement the Library has found in which a court records that a school-trust corpus was made whole after a breach had been declared.
  • Also held. Article VIII, § 8 "is simply a companion section to § 7," and so raised no independent question. On the intervenor's deed theory: "Here, the warranty deed from John A. Burbank by which the state acquired the land for the Springfield campus contained no restriction or reversionary clause such as that present in the deed involved in Patrick." On the due-process claim: "The failure to cite supporting authority is a violation of SDCL 15-26A-60(6) and the issue is thereby deemed waived."
  • Disposition. "We again reaffirm the disposition of the constitutional claims made with respect to S.B. 221 and affirm the trial court's order dismissing Intervenor's second amended complaint."
  • ⚠ Pin caution — the sharpest in this entry. The held copy contains no internal star-pagination whatsoever. The only pin the Library can honestly produce for this opinion is its first page: 403 N.W.2d 33. Do not manufacture "at 34." ⚠ Kanaly II is never mentioned in this opinion — not by name, not by citation. Any claim about the relationship between Kanaly II and Kanaly III must rest on something other than this text.
  • Supports: Ch. 3 (constitutional reception; Art. VIII §§ 7-8); Ch. 9 (full value as the measure of reimbursement); Ch. 18 (remedies — the record of completion, such as it is).

What Conservation Northwest actually says

The Library's earlier draft said Kanaly was "[c]ited nationally — including by the Washington Supreme Court in Conservation Northwest v. Commissioner of Public Lands (2022), slip op. at 17 n.7 — as a leading articulation of the perpetual-trust doctrine." The page and the footnote are right. The characterization is not, and the Library holds the Washington opinion, so this can be stated accurately.

Conservation Northwest cites Kanaly once, in a footnote, third in a three-state string behind Montana's Bryant and North Dakota's City of Sherwood, under a lead-in that limits it: "Further, although not determinative of DNR's trust obligations under Washington law, our conclusion also finds support in decisions from Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota, which were admitted to the Union under the same Enabling Act as Washington. The highest court of each of these states has held that the Enabling Act created a trust and that federally granted land was to be held in trust for the beneficiaries enumerated in the act." (Slip op. at 16-17 n.7; the lead-in crosses the page break, and the Kanaly citation itself is on 17.) The rationale is same-statute, not national stature: those three states were admitted under the same 1889 Omnibus Act. And the passage the Washington court quoted from Kanaly is pinned to 368 N.W.2d at 821-22 — the account of the Enabling Act and Article VIII, § 7, not the "beyond question" holding at 823.

That is a real and useful citation. It is not evidence that Kanaly is a leading national authority, and nothing held in this collection establishes that it is. Weigh it, too, against what the Washington court said in its own text: that Papasan v. Allain "made clear that other jurisdictions' interpretation of their enabling acts does not necessarily determine DNR's obligations under Washington law."

[VERIFY: the Library's copy of Conservation Northwest is the slip opinion, captioned Conservation Northwest v. Franz; the bound 200 Wn.2d pin page is not derivable from it, and the copy is internally inconsistent about the parallel citation, giving 513 P.3d 769 in its header and 513 P.3d 752 in a preserved digest. Neither number appears in the opinion text. Cite without a pin, or from the bound reporter — do not convert a slip page into a reporter page, and do not take the parallel citation from this copy.]

Authorities identified but not yet held

• Merkwan v. State by and through Janklow, 375 N.W.2d 624 (S.D. 1985) — the decision addressing the statute that, on Kanaly II's account, mooted the Kanaly I plaintiffs' requested relief. Not held. The highest-priority South Dakota acquisition: it is the hinge between the violation and the reimbursement, and the Library currently has only Kanaly II's one-sentence description of it. ⚠ Note what that description does and does not say: Kanaly II cites Merkwan for the fact of the transfer and for the obviation point. It does not say the court "sustained" the statute, and no held primary establishes that it did.

• The Omnibus Enabling Act of February 22, 1889 and the South Dakota Constitution in their own text. The Library reads both here only as quoted inside the opinions, and the Kanaly I copy's rendering of Enabling Act § 11 carries optical-recognition damage.

• The bound reporter for 401 N.W.2d 551-552 and for 403 N.W.2d 33. Both held copies are missing pagination the Library would need to pin accurately.

• The earlier South Dakota line on competitive bidding, appraised value and the institutional-trust grants. The Library's own pages name five decisions in this line — State v. Ruth (1896), Schelle v. Foss, 76 S.D. 620, 83 N.W.2d 847 (1957), Matthews (1959), Fox v. State (1977) and Olson (2009) — together with an unnamed 1997 opinion on an administrative-cost loophole. None is held here and none has been read against a primary. ⚠ The naming is itself unverified, and the Library's pages do not agree with each other: the South Dakota state page calls the 1959 decision Matthews v. Linn; the Kanaly case file calls it Matthews v. State. Only Schelle carries a reporter citation on any Library page. Treat every name here as a lead to be checked, not as an authority. [VERIFY]

• South Dakota Attorney General opinions. None held.

• Current corpus, annual distribution and remaining trust acreage. Carried from the state dossier; no primary. [VERIFY]

Cross-reference map (section → South Dakota authority)

What the build found

Six statements did not survive contact with the opinions. They are listed in descending order of consequence. Two were internal to the Library's own working files; four had reached pages the Library already publishes — the South Dakota state page, the court-atlas entry and the Kanaly case file. The corrections to those pages are in this pass; the record of this build is in the Library's corrections log.

1. A remedy the court never ordered, published as one it granted. The Library's Kanaly case file told readers, under the heading "The restoration remedy is operative," that the court "did not merely declare the transfer unlawful; it required reimbursement," and the South Dakota state page said Kanaly "ordered the state to reimburse the trust the full market value of what was transferred." Neither is what happened. Kanaly I declared the transfer unconstitutional, held that the legislature "will have to reimburse," expressly left the method to the legislature, remanded only to value the property, and held a conditional deadline in reserve. Two years later the same court said the remand "did not make the educational fund a trust administered through the court. . . . It remained a trust under the control and management of the legislature." Kanaly II, 401 N.W.2d at 554. This is the same failure mode the Library found in Oklahoma's Nigh entry: a declaration published as a decree.

2. A fabricated quotation in the Library's internal authorities register. The register recorded Kanaly II as holding the school trust "managed by the legislature" — in quotation marks, as the court's words. The phrase is not in the opinion. What the court actually wrote, at 554, is "It remained a trust under the control and management of the legislature." The fabricated form is withdrawn from the register in this pass. ⚠ The treatise chapters and the book manuscripts use the same words without quotation marks, as the Library's own paraphrase, which is accurate and needs no change; the public catalog never carried the phrase at all. This is the second fabricated judicial quotation this program of checking has found in the register, and the third consecutive state build in which a sentence attributed to a court turned out to have no source.

3. A characterization the opinion does not bear. The court-atlas entry says Kanaly "synthesized federal and sister-state precedent into one of the strongest national statements of the perpetual-trust doctrine." In its own voice the opinion cites five non-South-Dakota authorities against more than twenty of its own, four of the five in a single paragraph, and it cites neither Ebke nor Propst. That is a string citation, not a synthesis.

4. Quotation marks around words the court was reporting, not adopting. The "irrevocable compact / solemn agreement / contract" passage, published on the court-atlas entry as what the grant "is." Kanaly attributes all three descriptions to other courts and adopts neither "irrevocable" nor "solemn agreement," though it does adopt the nouns compact and contract in the next sentence. The subject of the sentence is also not the grant but the procedure of enabling legislation plus state acceptance.

5. A sister-state citation overstated in three ways. See above: "cited nationally" and "a leading articulation of the perpetual-trust doctrine" are not supported by the Washington opinion, which expressly called the sister-state decisions "not determinative"; and a slip-opinion pin was carried for a case that is in the official reporter. ⚠ A related chronology error on the same page — that the Skamania and Nigh courts had cited Kanaly, which is impossible, both having been decided before it — was found and corrected in an earlier pass, on August 20, 2026, and is no longer live. One residue remains and is corrected here: Kanaly does not cite Skamania, or any Washington authority at all.

6. A citation to a case that does not exist. A second Kanaly opinion at 397 N.W.2d 374 (S.D. 1986), carried in some source materials, is not a real citation: no opinion in this line is reported there, and searches of the case-law databases the Library uses return nothing at it. The genuine sequels are Kanaly II, 401 N.W.2d 551 (S.D. 1987), and Kanaly III, 403 N.W.2d 33 (S.D. 1987). An independent read of Kanaly III confirms its text contains no reference to that citation. Do not cite 397 N.W.2d 374.

A note on the Library's own copies, and one thing this build did not change. The archival copy of Kanaly I carries a cataloging note pairing the case with Nebraska's Ebke and Propst; Kanaly cites neither, and the note is being corrected in the archival copy itself, not only where it is quoted. The archival copy of Conservation Northwest carries a summary header naming Madsen, J. as the author; the opinion text says Whitener, J. The authorities register already records Whitener correctly, so the error is in the summary header alone. ⚠ One divergence between the Library's pages is not resolved by this build and is flagged rather than fixed: the court-atlas entry grades South Dakota "under review" pending verification of lease pricing, the institutional trusts and recent appropriations, while the state page records the verdict "Kept faith." Both are the Library's own voice and they cannot both be its position.

Appendix A — South Dakota, v2. Built against the three primary opinions held in the Library's collection: Kanaly v. State by and through Janklow, 368 N.W.2d 819 (S.D. 1985); Kanaly v. State ex rel. Janklow, 401 N.W.2d 551 (S.D. 1987); and Kanaly v. State by and through Janklow, 403 N.W.2d 33 (S.D. 1987) — each read in full — together with the Library's copy of the Washington Supreme Court's slip opinion in Conservation Northwest v. Commissioner of Public Lands (2022), read for the one sister-state citation this entry states. Items the primaries cannot establish carry a [VERIFY] flag rather than an assertion. Corrections arising from this build are recorded in the Library's corrections log.